When AI agents went wrong, and what they could reach
A running list of public incidents involving AI agents, MCP servers and the identities behind them. Each entry says what happened and what the agent could reach.
Public incidents
8 entries so far, newest first. Entries are summaries of public reports, not findings from nerl0 scans.
The Agent Reachability ReportA malicious npm package posing as a mail MCP server quietly copied outgoing email to an outside address.
Stolen OAuth tokens from a connected sales tool were used to read data in customers' CRM workspaces.
A compromised package ran locally installed AI command-line tools to search developer machines for secrets.
A support ticket with hidden instructions made an agent with database access reveal private data.
A harmful instruction was merged into an AI coding extension and released before it was caught.
An agent with write access to production deleted a live database during a code freeze.
A crafted email made a workplace AI assistant send internal data out without any click by the user.
A public issue with hidden instructions made an agent read from private repositories and publish what it found.
Read every incident as a path
The same question sits behind each one: which identity could reach which data, and through what.